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Jordan v. Jensen 
The sole notable development in Utah’s oil and gas jurisprudence this 
year was the case of Jordan v. Jensen. In Jordan, the Supreme Court of 
Utah considered the impact of insufficient notice to a record mineral owner 
on the validity of a tax sale of the overlying surface parcel.1  The Jordans’ 
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 1. Jordan v. Jensen, 391 P.3d 183, 185 (Utah 2017). 
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predecessors owned the minerals underlying a tract of land in Uintah 
County, having conveyed the surface away in 1995, expressly reserving all 
oil, gas, and mineral rights.2  From 1995 to 1999, the property was subject 
to a single annual tax assessment from Uintah County (the “County”), with 
all tax notices directed only to the surface owner.3 The surface owner failed 
to pay the taxes during that period, and in May 2000, the County seized and 
sold the property at a tax sale to the Jensens’ predecessor.4 The tax deed 
from the County did not contain any exception, reservation, or other 
recognition of the severed mineral interest.5  After leasing activity 
eventually gave rise to disagreements over mineral ownership between the 
Jordans and the Jensens, the Jordans and their oil and gas lessee (the 
“Appellees”) filed suit to quiet title to the mineral estate.6  
In Utah, a county may sell real property after taxes remain delinquent for 
four years,7 provided that the county affords proper notice of the sale to 
“‘the last-known recorded owner . . . and all other interests of record . . . at 
their last known address.’”8 The Jensens conceded that the County failed to 
give notice of the tax sale to the Jordans or any other record mineral owner 
or lessee.9 Thus, the court faced the single issue on appeal of “whether Utah 
Code section 78B-2-206 can apply to bar the Appellees’ challenge to the 
validity of the Jensens’ tax title even though Uintah County failed to 
provide the Jordans with notice of the tax sale as required by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”10 
The trial court found that Section 206 could not bar the challenge to the 
tax sale “because ‘the sale, if intended to convey the severed mineral 
interest, was without due process of law, and resulted in an unconstitutional 
taking.’”11  The Jensens, relying on the supportive precedent of Hansen v. 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id. at 186.   
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 186-87. 
 5. Id. at 187. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. at 186-87 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1346(1) (West 2016)). 
 8. Id. at 186-87 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1351(2)(a) (West 2016)). 
 9. Id. at 189. 
 10. Id. at 189. Utah Code § 78B-2-206 provides in relevant part that “[a]n action or 
defense to recover, take possession of, quiet title to, or determine the ownership of real 
property may not be commenced against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four 
years from the date of the sale, conveyance or transfer of the tax title to any county, or 
directly to any other purchaser at any public or private tax sale.” 
 11. Jordan, 391 P.3d at 189. 
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Morris,12 claimed on appeal that insufficient notice of a tax sale did not 
render Section 206’s four-year limitations period inapplicable.13  In 
Hansen, the Supreme Court of Utah denied claims that a procedural failure 
in perfecting title via tax sale, including statutorily inadequate notice of a 
tax sale, would affect the statute of limitations in Section 206, which was 
enacted to “validate tax titles.”14  
However, based on a series of post-Hansen due process decisions from 
the Supreme Court of the United States, the Utah high court determined that 
“Hansen is no longer good law on this point.”15  Instead, as illustrated by 
the Supreme Court of the United States holdings in Mennonite Board of 
Missions v. Adams,16 Schroeder v. City of New York,17 Tulsa Professional 
Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,18 and Texaco, Inc. v. Short,19 the Supreme 
Court of Utah explained that “a statute providing a limitations period will 
not apply when it is triggered by constitutionally defective state action.”20 
The Jordan court held that Section 206, like the statutes in Schroeder and 
Tulsa, is triggered by state action as it is designed to come into effect upon 
the tax sale.21  Therefore, “because section 206 was triggered by the 
county’s unconstitutional conduct in failing to provide the Jordans with 
constitutionally adequate notice of the tax sale, it would be repugnant to 
due process to apply that statute to bar the Appellees’ challenge now.”22 
 The court in Jordan stressed that its inquiry was limited to the issue of 
whether Section 206’s four-year statute of limitations could bar the 
Appellees’ challenge to the unconstitutional tax sale.23 Yet, without much 
explanation, the court went beyond this initial question in holding that the 
defective notice of the tax sale meant not only that the Appellees’ could 
bring their suit, but that “the county’s failure to provide notice prevented 
the Jordans’ mineral interest from passing at the tax sale.”24 According to 
the court, because a county “lacks jurisdiction to sell property when it fails 
                                                                                                                 
 12. 283 P.2d 884 (Utah 1955). 
 13. Jordan, 391 P.3d at 189-91.  
 14. Id. at 191; see Hansen, 283 P.2d 884, 885-86. 
 15. Jordan, 391 P.3d at 191. 
 16. 462 U.S. 791 (1983). 
 17. 371 U.S. 208 (1962). 
 18. 485 U.S. 478 (1988). 
 19. 454 U.S. 516 (1982). 
 20. Jordan, 391 P.3d at 191. 
 21. Id. at 193. 
 22. Id. at 195. 
 23. Id. at 196. 
 24. Id. 
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to provide interested parties of a tax sale,” the County had no jurisdiction 
over the Jordans’ mineral interest and therefore that interest could not be 
conveyed by the County’s tax sale.25 
  
                                                                                                                 
 25. Id.  
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